إشكالية التعميم الاستقرائي في العلوم الشرعية والتجريبية: دراسة مقارنة بين الفكر الإسلامي والفكر الغربي

Abstract

In the study of "Usul al-Fiqh" (fundamentals of jurisprudence), one observes a prevailing methodological focus, distinguishing scholars in this field through their pronounced tendency towards practical reasoning, particularly evident in issues of juristic analogy (qiyas). Although qiyas had evolved into a definitive form, scholars gradually shifted towards induction upon recognizing the limitations of qiyas due to its lack of conclusiveness. Consequently, Usul al-Fiqh continued to rely on analogy in most of its discussions, notably in the division of legal texts into "definitive and speculative." This approach led to the significant issue of the scarcity of texts with a "definitive/categorical nature," resulting in various methodological problems. This challenge was subsequently encountered by Muslim natural scientists, whose experimental methods faced the same issue, raising the question: How do we infer the unseen from the observed? Contemporary philosophers of science have posed similar questions: What is the basis of our inductive generalizations—reason or experience? What philosophical guarantees support the transition from judgments about parts to judgments about wholes (in the natural sciences)? How can we assess the validity of this transition as both correct and certain? And if no such guarantee exists, does science retain its justification, and what is its future?