Introduction
Climate change,
often referred to as the long-term alteration of temperature and typical
weather patterns in a specific region or globally, is primarily driven by human
activities such as the emission of GHG like carbon dioxide (CO2)
and methane, inter alia, into the atmosphere.[1]
These gases trap heat, leading to a gradual increase in global temperatures,
which in turn disrupts weather patterns, accelerates the melting of ice caps
and glaciers, raises sea levels, and intensifies extreme weather events such as
hurricanes, droughts, and floods.[2]
Understanding
climate change is crucial because it poses significant threats to ecosystems,
human health, economies, and global stability.[3] The impacts of
climate change are far-reaching and affect various aspects of life on earth,
including agriculture, water resources, biodiversity, and human settlements.[4]
Addressing climate change requires collective action at local, national, and
international levels to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, adapt to its effects,
and transition towards a more sustainable and resilient future.
In the ongoing
battle against climate change, developing countries find themselves at the
forefront, bearing a disproportionate burden of its impacts.[5]
The term ‘developing countries’ is commonly used to describe States
characterised by lower levels of industrialisation, income per capita,
and human development indicators when compared with advanced economies, though
the category lacks a universally agreed legal definition.[6]
With rising sea levels and an increase in extreme weather events, these nations
face significant challenges.[7]
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), they endure
a staggering fifteen times more casualties from natural disasters compared to
their developed counterparts.[8]
The aftermath of such disasters imposes substantial financial strain on these
nations, prompting calls for increased support to mitigate climate change
impacts.[9]
In response to
these challenges, the UN Climate Change Conference 2022 (COP27) in Egypt marked
a significant milestone.[10]
Participating nations reached an agreement to establish the “Loss and Damage
Fund”, aimed at assisting low-income developing countries in coping with the
aftermath of climate change-induced natural disasters.[11]
This initiative, crucial for vulnerable nations, received widespread support.[12]
To oversee the implementation of the fund and related climate finance
mechanisms, a Transitional Committee comprising representatives from various
nations was formed, reflecting a collaborative effort between developed and
developing countries.[13]
Fast forward to
the UN Climate Change Conference 2023 (COP28) in Dubai, United Arab Emirates,
and the focus on climate finance for developing nations remains steadfast.[14]
During the inaugural plenary session of the Conference, participants made
history by endorsing the creation of a dedicated fund to address and compensate
for climate change-related losses and damages.[15] This decision
underscores the collective commitment to supporting vulnerable nations in their
fight against climate change impacts.[16]
Taking a cue from these previous Conferences, the UN Climate Change Conference
2024 (COP 29) held in Baku, centrally focused on the issue of climate finance.
The Conference, in alignment with the report of the first global stocktakes of
the Paris Agreement,[17]
affirmed the need for increased adaptation and mitigation financing as critical
enablers for the achievement of the global climate goals, especially for
developing countries. Hence, a new finance goal was set to help national
governments, especially those of developing countries, protect their economies
and societies against climate disasters. Pursuant to the new finance goal, it
was agreed that climate financial aid to developing countries be tripled from
the previous goal of USD$100 billion per annum to USD $300 billion per annum by
2035.[18]
It was further agreed that all relevant actors will make efforts to scale up
finance to developing countries from both public and private sources up to
USD$1.3 trillion per annum by 2035.[19]
Against this
background, this paper scrutinizes the major countries that have historically
contributed, and those presently contributing to climate pollution, alongside
their corresponding contributions to the CLDF and other major climate funds.
The CLDF, formally known as the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage
(FRLD), is a multilateral climate finance mechanism established under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).[20]
Its purpose is to provide grants or other financial assistance to developing
and climate-vulnerable countries to address both economic and non-economic
losses and damages caused by climate change, especially where mitigation
and adaptation efforts have failed, are insufficient, or are too late. Such
losses include those arising from sudden/extreme events (e.g., hurricanes,
floods), as well as slow-onset processes (e.g., sea-level rise,
desertification).[21]
The CLDF, recently established, aims to address the urgent need for climate
change financing specifically for disproportionately affected nations that lack
sufficient resources to manage these impacts, despite the existence of other
climate funding sources. The paper meticulously analyses the financial
commitments of each major polluter, shedding light on the disparities in
funding allocated to address climate change compared to other types of funds,
particularly military expenditure. Furthermore, the paper draws insights from
these findings to elucidate lessons learned, offering recommendations aimed at
fostering greater accountability and proactive measures for climate action.
Through this comprehensive examination, the authors endeavour to contribute to
the ongoing discourse on equitable resource allocation and sustainable
environmental policies.
Methodology
This article
employs a doctrinal legal research design, anchored in a close reading of
primary instruments and decisions under the UNFCCC regime (including the Kyoto
Protocol, the Paris Agreement, and decisions of COP27–COP29), together with
relevant soft-law texts and institutional guidance. These sources are
interpreted to identify the legal bases, objectives, and operational contours
of the CLDF and its relationship to existing climate-finance mechanisms (e.g.,
the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund). In addition, the doctrinal
analysis is informed by established principles of international law such as the
duty to prevent transboundary harm, state responsibility, and the principle of
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
(CBDR-RC).[22]
The study further draws on concepts of climate justice and obligations of
international cooperation under Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter,[23]
thereby situating the CLDF within a broader legal and normative framework.
A comparative
assessment is then undertaken to juxtapose historical and contemporary
emissions profiles of major polluters with their financial commitments to the
CLDF and other funds. Authoritative secondary datasets—such as those produced
by the IPCC, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the World
Resources Institute, the World Bank, and similar bodies—are used to situate
pledges against measures of responsibility and capacity to pay. These empirical
comparisons are grounded in normative legal debates around equity, distributive
justice, and the erga omnes nature of environmental obligations,
ensuring that the analysis moves beyond descriptive statistics to engage with
the underlying jurisprudential questions. In parallel, an interdisciplinary
lens incorporates empirical evidence on global public finance and military
expenditure (e.g., SIPRI), enabling a structured comparison between
climate-finance allocations and competing fiscal priorities, and assessing
whether present contributions are commensurate with projected loss-and-damage
needs to 2030 and beyond. The analysis is organised around three evaluative
themes: equity and responsibility (operationalising CBDR-RC in contribution
patterns), adequacy and sustainability (testing the sufficiency and
predictability of funding against estimated loss-and-damage ranges), and
governance and accountability (scrutinising inclusivity, transparency, and
recipient access—particularly for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and
developing countries). This thematic framework is supported by
legal-theoretical constructs drawn from international environmental law, human
rights law, and global justice scholarship. The study does not undertake
original econometric modelling; it relies on triangulation across reputable
secondary sources and acknowledges data lags and definitional divergences
between pledges, disbursements, and eligible finance. These limitations are
mitigated by cross-verification across institutions and by focusing on trends
and ratios rather than absolute figures where appropriate.
1.
Historic and Current Climate Change Key Polluters
Climate change, a
pressing global issue, is primarily driven by anthropogenic activities, with
certain entities historically contributing significantly to greenhouse gas
emissions. The Industrial Revolution marked a pivotal point in human history,
characterized by the widespread use of fossil fuels and the acceleration of
industrial activities.[24]
CO2 emissions soared during this period, with estimates suggesting
an increase from approximately 280 parts per million (ppm) in the
pre-industrial era to over 400 ppm in recent years.[25]
According to the latest data released by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration Global Monitoring Lab in their annual report, the global average
atmospheric CO2 reached 422.03 parts per million in September 2024,
marking a significant increase and setting a new record.[26]
This CO2 comparison is represented in Figure 1 below, showing the
drastic and modern increase since the industrial era to the present. The surge
in emissions can be attributed to the proliferation of coal-fired factories and
the expansion of transportation networks, particularly in Western Europe and
North America.[27]
For instance, the United Kingdom's coal consumption skyrocketed from around 10
million tonnes in 1800 to 258 million tonnes by 1903, resulting in a
substantial contribution to global emissions.[28]
Throughout the
20th century, developed nations, including the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Germany, emerged as major contributors to climate change. Data
compiled by the World Resources Institute (WRI) indicate that the United States
alone accounted for approximately 25% of cumulative CO2 emissions
between 1751 and 2017.[29]
Similarly,
Germany's industrial prowess fuelled significant emissions, with the country
ranking among the top emitters per capita during the 20th century.[30]
Moreover, the exponential growth of the automobile industry in developed
countries significantly augmented emissions, further exacerbating the climate
crisis.[31]
In recent decades, rapid industrialization in emerging economies, notably
China, the United States of America, and India, has reshaped the global
emissions landscape.[32]
China, now the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, has experienced an
unprecedented surge in emissions due to its heavy reliance on coal for
electricity generation and industrial production but at the same time provides
the largest investments in renewable energy and a fast track to decarbonize its
industries.[33]
Figure
1: The line graph shows a drastic rise in CO2
levels in recent years compared to the industrial period
This line graph in Figure 1[34]
shows the historical rise in atmospheric CO₂, from approximately 280 ppm
in the pre-industrial era to a record 422.03 ppm in 2024. The sharp increase
underscores the impact of industrialization, fossil fuel use, and deforestation
on atmospheric CO₂ concentrations over time.
Data from the
European Commission JRC Science for Policy 2023 Report reveals that China
accounted for approximately 29.2% of global GHG emissions in 2023.[35]
Similarly, the United States of America accounted for approximately 11.2% of
global GHG emissions in 2022, and India accounted for 7.3%.[36]
Other major greenhouse gas emitters include the European Union, responsible for
6.7% of global emissions, Russia with 4.8%, and Brazil with 2.4%, while the
remaining countries collectively accounted for 38.4%, based on 2022 data.[37]
This information is shown in Figure 2, which shows the correlation between
major countries of the world and the global emissions rate. Together, these
emerging economies have significantly contributed to the rise in global
emissions, underscoring the need for concerted international action.
Figure 2: The
percentage of global greenhouse gas emissions by the world's major polluters
Source: Crippa, M.,
Guizzardi, D., Pagani and others, GHG Emissions of All World Countries (JRC/IEA
Report, 2023) European Commission EUR 31658 EN.[38]
Deforestation and
land-use change also play a pivotal role in climate change, releasing vast
amounts of CO2 into the atmosphere. Data indicate that deforestation
rates have accelerated in recent decades, particularly in tropical regions such
as the Amazon basin and Southeast Asia.[39] For example,
Brazil, home to the Amazon rainforest, has witnessed a dramatic increase in
deforestation due to agricultural expansion and logging activities, even though
it has managed to improve in some sensitive areas like the Amazon region.[40]
Similarly, land-use change associated with urbanization and agricultural
expansion has contributed to the loss of carbon sinks, further exacerbating
climate change.[41]
In response to the
growing threat of climate change, international agreements such as the Kyoto
Protocol and the Paris Agreement have sought to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions. The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, established binding emission
reduction targets for developed countries, albeit with limited success.[42]
Subsequently, the Paris Agreement, signed in 2015, set more ambitious goals to
limit global warming to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.[43]
However, despite these efforts, global emissions continue to rise, underscoring
the challenges associated with addressing climate change on a global scale.
2. The Climate Loss and Damage Fund
The establishment
of the CLDF marks a pivotal moment in global climate policy, as it directly
addresses the long-recognised need to support countries disproportionately
affected by the impacts of climate change. It reflects the understanding that
adaptation and mitigation measures alone are insufficient to comprehensively
respond to the wide range of climate-related losses, particularly in vulnerable
nations. This concept gathered significant momentum during successive meetings
of the UNFCCC, most notably at COP26 and COP27.[44]
“International
attention to the issue of loss and damage[45] was first
galvanised at COP19 in Warsaw, where the Warsaw International Mechanism for
Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM) was established in
2013.[46]
The WIM underscored the need for dedicated financial resources to assist
countries most severely affected by the adverse impacts of climate change.
However, it was not until COP26 in Glasgow that developing nations openly
voiced their dissatisfaction with the lack of urgency in creating a separate
fund devoted to this purpose, contending that the existing frameworks were
inadequate to address the escalating challenges posed by climate-related
events. [47]
A breakthrough
occurred at COP27, held in Sharm El-Sheikh, where agreement was reached among
Parties to establish a fund dedicated exclusively to addressing loss and damage
associated with climate change impacts. This development marked a significant
milestone in international environmental negotiations.[48]
The decision was subsequently formalised at COP28 in Dubai, resulting in the
creation of the CLDF as an official body under the UNFCCC framework. The Fund’s
primary objective is to provide financial assistance both in the immediate
aftermath of extreme weather events—such as hurricanes and floods—and over the
longer term in response to slow-onset processes, including sea-level rise and
desertification.[49]
COP29 marked a
critical moment for the Loss and Damage Fund, established at COP28, yet fell
short of meaningful progress. While key documents were signed to enable the
fund's distribution starting in 2025 and pledges increased from $674 million to
$759 million, UN Secretary-General António Guterres emphasized that the initial
capitalization was woefully inadequate in addressing the needs of vulnerable
nations. The conference revealed deep political divisions surrounding climate
finance. Developing countries, represented by the G7 and China, pushed for
expanded support mechanisms, including regional offices for the Santiago
Network and comprehensive reporting on loss and damage. However, developed
countries remained resistant, ultimately blocking most substantive proposals.[50]
Critical
unresolved issues included the fund's financing, the scope of loss and damage
reporting, and the creation of a proposed regular “Gap Report” to estimate
climate-related damages. Despite initial optimism, negotiations stalled, with
talks repeatedly pushed back to the June 2025 climate negotiations under “Rule
16” – highlighting the persistent challenges in establishing a robust
international response to climate-induced loss and damage.[51]
The conference underscored a stark reality: while symbolic steps were taken,
the international community remains far from effectively addressing the
financial burdens faced by the most climate-vulnerable nations.
Governance
arrangements concerning the CLDF include having representatives selected from
both donor and recipient nations serving as board members responsible for
decision-making, so that no single group dominates over others when it comes to
sharing out resources fairly within CLDF. Currently, the World Bank has been
suggested as an interim host institution for the secretariat office, although
some critics argue that this might lead to undue influence by richer states
housed under such an organization.[52]
The CLDF will be accessible mainly by vulnerable SIDS and other developing
countries. These developing countries or SIDS may submit proposals explaining
their needs, plus strategies on how they intend to utilize funds granted.[53]
It is noteworthy
that the CLDF is plagued by some obstacles. In particular, securing enough and
continuous money remains a priority as the projected cost of loss and damage is
estimated to be between $290bn- $580bn per year by 2030.[54]
This information is represented by Figure 3 below, which shows the drastic
increase in costs as the years increase up to 2030. Other than traditional
funds, new financial mechanisms are being brought up, such as carbon pricing
and levies on fossil fuel extraction or international shipping and aviation
emission taxes.[55]
These steps are crucial in filling the gap between what is promised now and
what affected states need financially.
It must be noted
that at the time of writing this paper, the focus was placed on developments
from COP27 to COP29. Since then, COP 30 was held in 2025, in Brazil, where the
CLDF saw a significant increase in pledges totalling around $12bn and the focus
was to move from pledges to actionable support for developing countries. Further,
the “Barbados Implementation Modalities”, which seeks to allow rapid and
measured disbursements of funds, was introduced, inter alia. These
are significant breakthroughs since the genesis of the CLDF, but even with
increased pledges, financial support remains a critical issue to meet projected
needs.
Figure
3: The projected cost for the climate loss
and damage fund
Source: Eco-Business,
'What next for the new UN climate loss and damage fund?' (Eco-Business, 6th
December 2023)[58]
The line chart, in
Figure 3 above, with a shaded range, represents the projected annual costs for
loss and damage due to climate change. The estimated range for these costs spans
from $290 billion to $580 billion by 2030, underscoring the need for consistent
and substantial funding mechanisms to support vulnerable nations effectively.[59]
In conclusion,
setting up the CLDF is an important move in addressing climate change impacts
on developing countries. This shows that the world has realized that it needs
separate financial aid for nations recovering from climate-related losses and
preparing themselves against future shocks. But whether this project succeeds
will largely depend on its consistent funding provision mechanism; fair
distribution strategy; adaptability to changes brought about by global warming,
among others.[60]
3. The Climate Loss and Damage Fund and Other Climate
Funds
The initial
contributions towards the establishment of the CLDF reflect a strong
international commitment. For example, the United Arab Emirates pledged 100
million dollars, matched by Germany and supplemented by a collective
contribution of 245.39 million euros from the European Union, while the United
States committed 17.5 million dollars and Japan 10 million dollars.[61]
These figures, illustrated in Figure 4 below, highlight the comparatively
modest contributions of some of the world’s largest historical emitters. These
contributions are represented in Figure 4 below, which illustrates the
comparatively modest financial pledges made by some of the world’s largest
historical emitters. These figures demonstrate that, although developed
countries have shown willingness to support their less privileged counterparts,
the scale of their contributions remains considerably below the annual funding
requirements identified in global estimates.
Figure 4: The
amount of contributions pledged to the climate loss and damage fund as of 2024
by major nations
Source: World Economic Forum,
'COP28 agrees to establish loss and damage fund for vulnerable countries'
(World Economic Forum, 1 December 2023)[62]
The bar chart in
Figure 4 shows the financial commitments made by major contributors to the
fund. The United Arab Emirates, Germany, the EU, the United States, and Japan
are the primary contributors so far, with Germany and the EU together
contributing the largest amount.[63]
Despite these initial contributions, they still represent only a small fraction
of the estimated funds required annually.
On the other hand,
the primary goal of funding from other funds is to prevent and lessen the
effects of climate change. In certain situations, post-disaster assistance is
offered through parametric insurance, which partially covers loss and damage
and provides a prompt reimbursement for short-term recovery depending on the
event's severity rather than the size of the losses (Figure 5).
Figure 5: New
and Existing Funding Arrangements[64]
Source: Melanie Pill and Georgia
Hammersley, ‘A Climate Loss and Damage Fund That Works: A New United Nations
Climate Instrument to Support the Most Vulnerable Countries Will Make Its Mark
If It Follows Six Key Recommendations.’ (LOWY INSTITUTE, 2024)[65]
The Green Climate
Fund (GCF) and the Adaptation Fund are two other key players within
international climate finance mechanisms. The GCF was created under UNFCCC
during the Cancun Agreements in 2010, with an aim to help developing countries
in their transition towards low-carbon economies and becoming more resilient
against climate change impacts, by funding both mitigation and adaptation
projects.[66]
GCF has mobilized around $14.8billion (bn) from different donor countries,
including the USA, Japan, UK, Germany, France, among others, to date.[67]
The projects range widely, from renewable energy development to sustainable
agriculture, aimed at promoting low-emission development while enhancing
adaptation capacities.
On the other hand,
the Adaptation Fund was established under the Kyoto Protocol in 2009.[68]
Its operationalisation seeks to support the implementation of concrete
adaptation projects and programmes, primarily in developing countries that are
highly vulnerable to the effects of global warming. The bulk share comes from
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects revenues plus voluntary
contributions of donors’ governments. Thus far, about US$1 bn has been
allocated towards various adaptation initiatives like water management systems,
agriculture practices, coastal zone management programs, and safeguarding
communities living along these zones against rising sea levels and storm
surges.[69]
Besides, it is
debatable whether humanitarian assistance for Loss and Damage, which the Fund
for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) is responsible for, qualifies as an
existing funding arrangement for Loss and Damage because it does not fit the
criteria of climate finance under the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. After
many years of fierce negotiations, the FRLD was established in 2022 at COP27 in
Sharm El-Sheikh, with a Governing Instrument agreed upon the following year in
Dubai (COP28).[70]
The FRLD stands as
the sole multilateral fund specifically designed to address non-economic losses
caused by climate change. These losses present significant analytical
challenges due to their inherent complexity, intangibility, and resistance to
straightforward monetary quantification. Potential remediation strategies
extend beyond financial compensation, encompassing nuanced approaches such as
integrating cultural remembrance into educational curricula, issuing official
apologies, providing long-term counselling services, and organizing collective
mourning ceremonies. The proposed annual high-level dialogue, convened by the
UN Secretary-General, offers a critical platform for developing coordinated
funding arrangements and establishing standardized reporting mechanisms,
potentially modelled after the OECD Rio Marker system used for climate
mitigation and adaptation efforts.[71]
Like the
Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) was also created in
2001 and has a similarly intuitive name: it provides support for adaptation
solely for Least Developed Countries, the 46 poorest countries in the world. It
is operated by the Global Environment Facility. As of the end of 2023, it has
received $2.2 billion in cumulative contributions from 28 countries.[72]
Established in
2001, the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) represents a pivotal multilateral
financial mechanism designed to address diverse climate change challenges
through a strategically segmented approach. The fund comprises four distinctive
financing windows, each targeting critical dimensions of climate resilience and
sustainable development: 1) Adaptation Window: Focused on enhancing climate
change adaptation strategies and resilience mechanisms; 2) Technology Transfer
Window: Facilitating technological innovations and knowledge transfer to
support climate mitigation efforts; 3) Mitigation Sector Window: Targeting
comprehensive sectoral interventions across energy, transportation, industrial
processes, agriculture, forestry, and waste management systems; 4) Economic
Diversification Window: Supporting fossil-fuel-dependent economies in
developing alternative economic pathways.[73]
Operationally
managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the SCCF reveals significant
structural limitations. Notably, the Technology Transfer (SCCF-3) and Economic
Diversification (SCCF-4) windows remain financially dormant, having received no
contributions since inception. By the conclusion of 2023, the fund had
accumulated cumulative contributions totalling $433 million, sourced from a
consortium of 16 contributing countries. The fund's multifaceted design
underscores the complex institutional challenges in addressing climate change
through targeted financial interventions, highlighting the intricate
negotiations and strategic compromises inherent in international climate
finance mechanisms.
Figure 6 below
shows the vulnerability between funds. Analysing the trends across the COPs
shown in the image, a few key observations can be made: [74]
1. Increasing
Pledges from 2021 to 2023: The total pledges have risen steadily from $769
million in 2021 (COP26) to $1,018 million in 2023 (COP28). This indicates a
growing recognition and commitment from the international community to provide
climate finance through these UN funds.
2. Fluctuating
Pledges for 2024 (COP29): The total pledges for 2024 (COP29) show a
decrease to $228 million, down from the high of $1,018 million in 2023. This
may suggest potential challenges or uncertainties in sustaining the upward
trajectory of climate finance commitments.
3. Shifting
Priorities Across Funds: The Adaptation Fund has consistently received the
highest pledges, rising from $356 million in 2021 to $647 million in 2023. The
introduction of the FRLD in 2023 with a $192 million pledge reflects the
growing emphasis on addressing the impacts of climate change. In contrast, the
LDCF and SCCF have received relatively lower pledges, indicating potential
shifts in funding priorities.
4. Uneven
Commitments Across Funds: While the overall trend shows increasing climate
finance pledges, the distribution across the different funds is uneven, with
some funds (Adaptation Fund, FRLD) receiving significantly higher commitments
compared to others (LDCF, SCCF). This may suggest challenges in aligning
funding allocations with the diverse needs and priorities of different
countries and regions.
Based on the
above, the trend depicts a mixed picture, with an initial upward trajectory in
climate finance commitments followed by a potential plateau or decline, as well
as uneven distribution of pledges across the various UN climate funds. This
fluctuation highlights the fragility of the current system and the need for
more sustained and predictable funding to ensure the long-term stability and
effectiveness of the UN climate finance architecture. This highlights the
complexities and ongoing challenges in mobilizing and sustaining adequate
climate finance to address the multifaceted impacts of climate change.
Figure
6: UN Climate Funds in Recent Years[75]
Source: NRDC based on
pledges announced throughout 2024 and COP29 as of 26th November,
2024
4. Comparative Analysis with Other Climate Funds and
Major Global Military Expenditure
Although these
figures represent significant financial commitments towards climate funds, they
pale in comparison to global military spending. The estimated amount spent on
the world's armies in 2024 was $2.4tn, and projections suggest this will rise
even further in 2025.[76]
In fact, the US alone is expected to spend around $883.7bn on its military in
2024, thus reinforcing its position as the highest spender worldwide.[77]
China’s defence budget should increase to approximately 233bn dollars,[78]
whereas India plans to allocate about 74.3 bn dollars for their defence forces.[79]
These figures are represented in Figure 5 below, showing the drastic
expenditure of these major countries on their military. Moreover, the UK and
Germany, together with other NATO countries, still continue splashing out
billions each year on new weapon systems while cutting back social services and
development aid programmes aimed at the poorest people, both at home and
abroad.[80]
Figure
7: The recent military expenditure for major
countries
Sources: USSCAS,
‘Summary of the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defence Authorization Act’ (2024),
Meia Nouwens and Fenella McGerty, ‘China’s defence budget boost can’t mask real
pressures’ (2024), Gordon Arthur, ‘Despite security threats, India’s defence
budget remains static’ (2024) and Fenella McGerty, ‘NATO defence spending: a
bumper year’ (2024)
The horizontal bar
chart in Figure 7 above, displays military spending for key countries, with the
U.S., and global military spending standing out. Each bar shows the spending in
billions of USD, highlighting the significant allocation of resources to defence.
Several countries
provide substantial arms aid either directly or through private military
contractors. A notable example is Blackwater USA, which rebranded itself as
Academi and now called Constellis Holdings and operates globally, despite being
headquartered in North Carolina.[81]
The U.S. provides Israel with $3.8 bn annually in military support, as outlined
in a 10-year memorandum of understanding signed in 2016.[82]
Egypt receives approximately $1.3 bn in military aid annually, making it one of
the largest recipients of U.S. military assistance.[83]
Jordan, too, receives significant aid, around 1.45bn per year.[84]
Since the onset of the Ukraine conflict, the U.S. government provided over
$56bn in military assistance, which includes weaponry, training, and other
logistical support.[85]
In addition, in 2022, the United Kingdom has pledged £12.8 bn or $16.61 bn in
support to Ukraine in aid. At the end of February 2024, the German Ministry of
Defence said that military aid worth €28 bn or $30.25 bn had either been spent
since February 2022 or had been committed to support Ukraine over the next few
years.[86]
By the end of 2023, Germany is reported to have provided almost €15 bn in
military aid to Ukraine.[87]
This grave
disparity between climate fund contributions and military spending reflects a
stark difference in global priorities.
Figure 8: The
expenditure on military aid to Ukraine by major World countries and key climate
polluters
Sources:
Congressional
Research Service (CRS), "U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, Updated May
22, 2024; Michel Bourban, ‘Climate Change, Human Rights and the Problem of
Motivation’ (2014) 1 De Ethica: A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and
Applied Ethics 37.
The bar chart in
Figure 8, shows U.S. Aid, which is the largest, with a commitment of $56
billion, followed by Germany at $30.25 billion, and UK at $16.61 billion to
Ukraine.
Figure
9: U.S aid contributions to other countries
for different projects other than climate change
Sources: Congressional
Research Service (CRS), "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," Updated
February 18, 2022, Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: Background and U.S.
Relations," Congressional Research Service, Updated September 12, 2024,
Jeremy M. Sharp, CRS, "Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations,"
Updated July 1, 2024 and Congressional Research Service (CRS), "U.S.
Security Assistance to Ukraine, Updated May 22, 2024
The chart in
Figure 9 above, focuses on U.S. military aid allocations, showing the financial
support provided to key allies and conflict regions. Aid to Ukraine is the
largest, followed by consistent support to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan.
Estimates suggest
that the cost of loss and damage due to climate change could reach anywhere
between $290 bn and $580 bn annually by 2030.[88] Addressing
this challenge will require innovative financial solutions and unprecedented
international cooperation. Some proposals include placing a price on carbon
emissions, levies on fossil fuel extractions, and taxes on international
shipping and aviation emissions.[89]
This is because the success of the CLDF and other major climate funds will
ultimately depend on the ability to secure sustained funding, ensure equitable
distribution, and remain adaptable to the increasingly complex impacts of
climate change across the globe.
5. Lessons Learned
The global
response to climate change reveals profound challenges in the alignment of
financial resources with climate action, particularly when comparing funding
for climate-related initiatives to military spending. The
establishment of the CLDF at COP27 marks an important milestone in addressing
the inequitable impacts of climate change on vulnerable nations,[90]
and
may also be viewed as part of States’ duty to cooperate in solving
international problems under Articles 55 and 56 of the UN
Charter[91]
and as an expression of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) affirmed in the UNFCCC
and the Paris Agreement.[92]
The establishment
of the CLDF at COP27 marks an important milestone in addressing the inequitable
impacts of climate change on vulnerable nations.[93]
However, the stark contrast in resource allocation between military
expenditures and climate funding signals the need for urgent and sustained
reform in global financial priorities.[94] The
creation of the CLDF acknowledges that adaptation and mitigation measures alone
are inadequate for countries disproportionately affected by climate change,
particularly where extreme weather events such as hurricanes, floods, and
droughts intensify existing socio-economic vulnerabilities.[95]
Accordingly, this article focuses on the CLDF and compares it with other
funding commitments by major nations, highlighting how these countries tend to
prioritize alternative areas of expenditure over climate finance and support
for vulnerable States.
One of the
critical lessons learned from the establishment of the CLDF is the necessity of
targeted financial mechanisms for addressing specific aspects of climate
change, especially those related to loss and damage in developing nations. Before
COP26, developing countries consistently raised concerns that existing climate
finance structures—such as the GCF and Adaptation Fund—were inadequate to meet
the needs arising from increasingly severe and frequent climate disasters.[96]
The CLDF, therefore, fills a crucial gap in climate finance by providing
dedicated support to help nations recover from climate-related disasters that
existing mechanisms were unable to fully address.[97]
Yet
the insufficiency of commitments raises questions of State responsibility under
international environmental law, particularly the duty to prevent transboundary
harm as recognized by the International Court of Justice.[98] However,
the initial financial commitments to the CLDF remain insufficient to meet the
scale of the challenge as represented by Figure 3 above. For example, although
Germany, the EU, and the U.S. made significant contributions to the fund, these
donations fall short of the annual requirements to adequately address the
estimated costs of loss and damage, projected to reach between $290 bn and $580
bn per year by 2030, as illustrated by Figure 3.[99]
Moreover, comparing the
financial commitments made to the CLDF with military spending by the same
countries underscores the significant disparity in global priorities, a
disparity that must also be evaluated in light of States’ erga omnes
obligations to protect the environment as a “common concern of humankind,”
duties owed to the international community as a whole. As the International
Court of Justice explained in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power
Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase Judgment) [1970] ICJ Rep
3, 32–33, erga omnes obligations are those which States owe to the
international community as a whole, including obligations relating to the
protection of the environment. This understanding is reinforced by the preamble
to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which affirms that climate
change is a common concern of humankind.[100]
The United States,
for instance, committed only $17.5 million to the CLDF in contrast to its
military budget of approximately $883.7 bn in 2024.[101]
This comparison illustrates the significant underfunding of climate initiatives
in contrast to the massive financial resources directed toward defence. The
need to increase and sustain climate fund contributions is essential if we are
to effectively address the growing threats posed by global warming.[102]
Similarly, the
United Kingdom and Germany made substantial military commitments to aid
Ukraine, with the UK pledging £12.8 bn ($16.61 bn) and Germany providing €15 bn
($16.4 bn) by the end of 2023, as represented by Figure 8 above.[103]
These figures highlight the profound imbalance in global financial allocations,
suggesting that while the political will to support military efforts is robust,
the same level of commitment is lacking in addressing the existential threat of
climate change.[104]
This disparity reflects a global misalignment of priorities, where short-term
security concerns overshadow the longer-term but equally critical threats posed
by climate change.
Another key lesson
is the importance of innovative and diversified financial mechanisms to meet
the growing financial demands of climate change. The CLDF’s initial funding,
while symbolic of global cooperation, demonstrates the need for new sources of
revenue beyond traditional government contributions. Mechanisms such as carbon
pricing, levies on fossil fuel extractions, and taxes on international shipping
and aviation emissions have been proposed to fill the financial gap.[105]
Consistent
with the polluter pays principle, a well-established norm of international
environmental law,[106]
mechanisms such as carbon pricing, levies on fossil fuel extractions, and taxes
on international shipping and aviation emissions have been proposed to fill the
financial gap. These measures, if implemented, could
provide sustainable and predictable sources of funding for the CLDF and other
climate finance initiatives, ensuring that developing countries can respond to
both immediate climate disasters and long-term environmental degradation.[107]
However, achieving a broad international consensus on such mechanisms remains a
challenge, particularly given the differing economic interests of high-emitting
nations and developing countries.
A related issue is
the governance structure of the CLDF and other climate finance mechanisms.
Ensuring equitable distribution of funds and inclusive decision-making
processes is crucial for the success of these mechanisms. The CLDF’s governance
model, which includes representatives from both donor and recipient countries,
is a step in the right direction. However, concerns remain about the influence
of wealthier nations and international institutions, such as the World Bank, in
the administration of the fund.[108]
Developing countries have historically expressed concerns about the undue
influence of donor countries in shaping the policies and priorities of
international climate funds, which may not always align with the specific needs
of vulnerable populations.[109]
Ensuring transparency, accountability, and a balance of power within the
governance structure will be key to the CLDF’s success in delivering effective
support.
Furthermore, the
lesson that consistent and long-term financial commitments are vital to
addressing climate-related loss and damage cannot be overstated. While the
establishment of the CLDF is a positive step, its long-term viability hinges on
the continued commitment of donor countries to provide adequate and reliable
funding. Figures 2, 3, and 4 above illustrate those major countries that
contribute significantly to GHG and their low pledges to CLDF. Figure 3 shows
how climate financing will grow in the near future and the need for immediate
action. As climate change intensifies, the scale of loss and damage will only
grow, placing greater pressure on international financial mechanisms to
respond. The CLDF’s success will depend not only on the initial funding
commitments but also on its ability to adapt to evolving climate challenges and
secure additional resources over time.[110] This will
require sustained political will, robust international cooperation, and
innovative financial strategies.
Finally, the
lessons learned from the establishment of the CLDF extend beyond climate
finance and touch upon the broader issue of global priorities. The stark
contrast between the relatively small amounts allocated to climate funds and
the colossal sums directed toward military expenditures highlights the need for
a more holistic approach to global security. Climate change, as evidenced by
the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters, poses a clear and
present danger to global stability. Neglecting to finance
climate responses adequately risks undermining States’ obligations under
international human rights law to safeguard life, health, and development, as
well as their UN Charter duties to maintain international peace and security.[111]
Climate change, as evidenced by the increasing frequency and intensity of
natural disasters, poses a clear and present danger to global stability. Yet,
the financial resources allocated to addressing this threat remain
disproportionately low compared to traditional security concerns. The lesson
here is that global security must be redefined to include environmental
stability, and the allocation of resources must reflect this new understanding
of security.[112]
In conclusion, the
establishment of the CLDF at COP27 represents a significant achievement in the
global response to climate change. However, the lessons learned from this
process underscore the need for greater financial commitment, innovative
funding mechanisms, equitable governance structures, and a realignment of
global priorities to ensure that the world is adequately prepared to meet the
growing challenges posed by climate change. Addressing these lessons will be
critical in the years to come as the international community grapples with the
complex and ever-evolving impacts of global warming.
6. Conclusion and Recommendations
The establishment
of the CLDF marks a significant milestone in international climate governance,
particularly for developing nations that bear the brunt of climate-induced
disasters. While the CLDF addresses a critical gap in existing climate finance
mechanisms, it also highlights the persistent imbalance between military
spending and the funding allocated to climate change mitigation, adaptation,
and recovery efforts. The disproportionate allocation of resources reflects a
misalignment of global priorities, where immediate security concerns overshadow
the longer-term but equally urgent threat of climate change. If left
unaddressed, this imbalance will impede the global community’s ability to
adequately respond to the escalating challenges posed by climate change.
Despite the
promising steps taken at COP27, COP28, and even COP30, the current financial
commitments to the CLDF remain inadequate in the face of rising costs
associated with loss and damage, which are projected to reach between $290 bn
and $580 bn annually by 2030, as seen in Figure 3 above.[113]
This underscores the need for innovative financing mechanisms and more
sustained contributions from developed nations. Furthermore, the success of the
CLDF will depend not only on financial input but also on its governance
structures, which must ensure transparency, equity, and inclusivity in the
distribution of funds. Additionally, consistent and long-term political will is
crucial for the Fund’s survival and effectiveness in the years to come.
To address these
challenges, it is recommended that:
I.
Increase Financial
Commitments to the CLDF:
Developed
countries must significantly enhance their contributions to the CLDF in line
with their obligations under the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement (art 9), and
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities (CBDR-RC).[114]
Financing mechanisms such as carbon pricing, fossil fuel levies, and taxes on
international shipping and aviation emissions could be implemented through domestic
legislation harmonised with international commitments, or through a future protocol
or COP decision establishing binding financial pathways.[115]
II.
Strengthen Governance
Structures:
The
CLDF must adopt governance arrangements consistent with the principles of equity,
transparency, and inclusive participation recognised in international
environmental law.[116]
A reformed governance framework should guarantee equal representation for donor
and recipient States, particularly SIDS and Developing Countries. This could
take the form of a legally binding Governing Instrument under the UNFCCC,
with rules of procedure limiting undue donor influence.[117]
III.
Enhance International
Cooperation on Climate Finance:
States
are under a general obligation of international cooperation under Articles
55–56 of the UN Charter and the erga omnes character of
environmental protection.[118]
Strengthening cooperation requires legal integration of the CLDF with existing
mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund, possibly via
an amendment to the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC or a COP decision
under the Paris Agreement mandating coordination.[119]
IV.
Reassess Global Security
Priorities:
Climate
change must be recognised in international peace and security law as a
threat multiplier. The UN Security Council has already debated climate-security
risks, and General Assembly Resolution 76/300 (2022) recognises the right to a
clean, healthy, and sustainable environment.[120] States should
therefore consider reallocating resources under national budgetary
legislation in compliance with international human rights obligations,
particularly the duty to protect life (ICCPR, art 6).[121]
V.
Promote Innovative
Financial Solutions:
Innovative
strategies such as carbon trading, green bonds, and private sector investment
in resilience projects should be embedded within a legal framework ensuring
accountability, transparency, and enforceability. This could involve linking
such mechanisms to nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the
Paris Agreement or creating a new legal instrument on climate-resilient
finance.[122]
VI.
Ensure Long-Term and
Sustainable Funding:
The
longevity of the CLDF requires more than voluntary pledges: it must rest on binding,
predictable financial commitments. This could be achieved through a
formal replenishment cycle akin to the Green Climate Fund, codified in a COP
decision or a protocol amendment under the UNFCCC. Such reforms would align
with States’ duties under international environmental law to prevent harm and
protect vulnerable populations.[123]
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